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Governments around the world create and collect an enormous 
amount of data that covers important environmental, educational, 
geographical, meteorological, scientific, demographic, transport, tourism, 
health insurance, crime, occupational safety, product safety, and many 
other types of information.1  This data is generated as part of a 
government’s daily functions.2  Given government data’s exceptional social 
and economic value, former U.S. President Barack Obama described it as a 
“national asset.”3  For various policy reasons, open government data 
(“OGD”) has become a popular governmental practice and international 
 
* Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law in the Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.S.D., 
Stanford Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Ann S. Chiu, Tyng-Ruey 
Chuang, Brett Frischmann, Richard Gruner, Mike Madison, Sean Pager, Chung-Lun Shen, Ming-Yan 
Shieh, Victoria Stodden, Haochen Sun, Qian Wang, Zhang Ping, and participants in the “Museum 
Computing: An Approach to Bridging Cultures, Communities and Science” conference in National 
Palace Museum, Taipei, “Taking Data into the Public Domain” conference at the University of Macau, 
“Chengdu International Copyright Fortune Summit” held by the Chengdu Municipal Government, 2016 
Intellectual Property Scholar Conference (“IPSC”) at Stanford Law School, 2016 Annual Cross-Strait 
Four-Region Forum on Copyright in Taipei held by Fujen School of Law and Peking University Law 
School and Intellectual Property School, and Asia-Pacific Copyright Association (“APCA”)’s 2016 
conference on “Copyright in the Asian Pacific: The Challenges and Opportunities” at the University of 
Hong Kong Faculty of Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Lesley Luo Jingyu 
for her research assistance. 
1. Keiran Hardy & Alana Maurushat, Opening Up Government Data for Big Data Analysis and 
Public Benefit, 33 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 30, 31 (2017); NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT 
LICENSING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION 5 (5.0 ed. 2016), available at http://www. 
nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/uk-government-licensing-framework.pdf 
[hereinafter NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK]; JOSHUA TAUBERER, THE 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF OPEN GOVERNMENT DATA 10 (2nd ed. 2014); Katleen Janssen, The 
Influence of the PSI Directive on Open Government Data: An Overview of Recent Developments, 28 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 446, 446 (2011); Barbara Ubaldi, Open Government Data: Towards Empirical Analysis 
of Open Government Data Initiatives 4 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Working Papers on Public Governance No. 22, 2013), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/gov 
ernance/open-government-data_5k46bj4f03s7-en. 
2. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Commercializing Public Sector Information, 97 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 412, 413 (2015). 
3. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Obama Administration Releases Historic 
Open Data Rules to Enhance Government Efficiency and Fuel Economic Growth, OBAMA WHITE 
HOUSE ARCHIVE (May 9, 2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/09/ 
obama-administration-releases-historic-open-data-rules-enhance-government. 
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movement in recent years.4  Open government has therefore acquired a new 
meaning empowered by digital technologies and data science.5 
Numerous national and local governments in Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Taiwan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the 
United States (US), etc., have implemented new policies to release their 
data or encourage people to gain access to, use, and reuse, government 
data.6  It is estimated that more than 250 national or local governments 
from around 50 developed and developing countries have launched OGD 
initiatives.7  Data.gov, established by the United States federal government, 
and Data.gov.uk, launched by the British government, are both notable 
examples of data portals through which governments make their data 
available to the public.8  
In July 2013, G8 leaders signed the G8 Open Data Charter, which 
outlined five fundamental open data principles.9  Two years earlier, the 
 
4. See, e.g., JOEL GURIN, OPEN DATA NOW: THE SECRET TO HOT STARTUPS, SMART 
INVESTING, SAVVY MARKETING, AND FAST INNOVATION 216–18 (2014); Anneke Zuiderwijk & Marijn 
Janssen, Open Data Policies, Their Implementation and Impact: A Framework for Comparison, 31 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 17, 17 (2014); Teresa Scassa, Public Transit Data Through an Intellectual Property 
Lens: Lessons About Open Data, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1759, 1760–61 (2014); DEIRDRE LEE ET AL., 
OPEN DATA IRELAND: BEST PRACTICE HANDBOOK 26 (2014), per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/Best-
Practice-Handbook.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Jillian Raines, Note, The Digital Accountability and the Transparency Act of 2011 
(DATA): Using Open Data Principles to Revamp Spending Transparency Legislation, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 313, 321–24 (2013); Nataša Veljković et al., Benchmarking Open Government: An Open Data 
Perspective, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 278, 278–80 (2014); see also Jeremy Weinstein & Joshua Goldstein, 
The Benefits of A Big Tent: Opening Up Government in Developing Countries: A Response to Yu & 
Robin’s The New Ambiguity of “Open Government”, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 38, 40–41 (2012) 
(noting the distinction between and the convergence of the “technologies for open data” and “politics of 
open government.”). 
6. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 217–19; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 37–44, 228–29; 
TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 17–18, 24, 89-91; Hardy & Maurushat, supra note 1, at 33-34; Harlan Yu 
& David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open Government”, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 178, 
198–200 (2012); Tiago Peixoto, The Uncertain Relationship Between Open Data and Accountability: A 
Response to Yu and Robinson’s the New Ambiguity of “Open Government”, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 200, 210 (2013); KENT MEWHORT, CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSES: OPTIONS FOR 
CANADIAN OPEN DATA PROVIDERS, 5–7 (June 1, 2012), available at  cippic.ca/sites/default/files/ 
Creative%20Commons%20Licenses%20-%20Options%20for%20Canadian%20Open% 20Data%20Pro 
viders.pdf;  An Outline of the Government Open Data Promotion Situation in Taiwan, NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, available at  http://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8C362E80B 
990A55C&sms=1DB6C6A8871CA043&s=09819AC7E099BCD5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
7. Open Data in 60 Seconds,THE WORLD BANK, available at opendatatoolkit.worldbank.org/ 
en/open-data-in-60-seconds.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
8. GURIN, supra note 4, at 10–11, 218; Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 198, 200; see also 
JEAN-LOUIS MONINO & SORAYA SEDKAOUI, BIG DATA, OPEN DATA AND DATA DEVELOPMENT xxxv 
(2016) (noting that these are the two leading nations globally in promoting open data policies); Esteve 
Sanz, Open Governments and Their Cultural Transitions, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (Mila Gascó-Hernández ed., 2014) (describing the role 
of Data.gov). 
9. FAQ, OPEN DATA CHARTER, available at opendatacharter.net/faq/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2017). 
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international OGD movement had led to the establishment of the Open 
Data Partnership (ODP), “a multilateral initiative that aims to secure 
concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, 
empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to 
strengthen governance.”10  The ODP was initiated by eight national 
governments (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South 
Africa, the UK, and the US) with the proclamation of the Open 
Government Declaration on September 20, 2011.11  Sixty-two additional 
national governments have joined the ODP since its incorporation.12  
Moreover, seventy governments altogether have made more than 2,250 
commitments to implement open data policies.13  International 
organizations, such as the World Bank, have also actively advocated for 
and implemented open data policies.14 
Businesses are also embracing the open data trend as reflected in new 
strategies, applications, products, and services.  For example, Microsoft 
introduced the “Open Government Data Initiative” to promote the 
company’s Window Azure online platform as a tool for OGD.15  
Government data has become an increasingly important strategic source for 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth.16  Businesses may 
aggregate, repack, and redistribute the data, develop new applications and 
platforms, combine the data with other information, or explore novel ways 
to add value to government data.  Enterprises can make use of such data to 
provide services relating to travel, business planning, shopping advice, 
etc.17  The commercial value of this volume of government data is 
increasingly apparent in the Big Data technology environment.18  A number 
 
10. What Is the Open Government Partnership?, OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP, available 




14. See, e.g., World Bank Open Data, WORLD BANK, available at data.worldbank.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
15 See, e.g., Steve Clayton, Microsoft’s Open Government Data Initiative with Windows Azure, 
MICROSOFT DEVELOPER (May 11, 2009), available at blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/stevecla01/2009/05 
/11/microsofts-open-government-data-initiative-with-windows-azure/; Marius Oiaga, Windows Azure 
Powers Microsoft Open Government Data Initiative, SOFTPEDIA (May 7, 2009), available at 
news.softpedia.com/news/Windows-Azure-Powers-Microsoft-Open-Government-Data-Initiative-1110 
61.shtml. 
16. See infra Section II.B. 
17. See, e.g., Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information 
Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 2081 (2015). 
18. See, e.g., MONINO & SEDKAOUI, supra note 8, at 30–33, 38; Michael Chui et al., Generating 
Economic Value Through Open Data, in BEYOND TRANSPARENCY: OPEN DATA AND THE FUTURE OF 
CIVIC INNOVATION 163, 163 (Brett Goldstein & Lauren Dyson eds., 2013); Joel Gurin, Big Data and 
Open Data: How Open Will the Future Be?, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 691, 699–700 
(2015); Hardy & Maurushat, supra note 1, at 30-31; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 5–7; see also Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen, The Social Impact of Open Data, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (July 23, 2014), available 
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of nonprofit organizations (NPOs), such as the Open Data Institute, Open 
Knowledge Foundation, and the Sunlight Foundation, have also actively 
taken part in the OGD movement in different ways.19 
OGD policy involves various legal issues, ranging from personal data 
protection,20 citizens’ right of access to government information or freedom 
of information,21 the attribution of legal liability,22 and appropriate parties 
to release government data.23  Intellectual property (IP) licensing has both 
been viewed as a cornerstone for OGD,24 and, from a cynical perspective, 
as one of the main obstacles to the release of governments’ open data.25  
Entrepreneurs may hesitate to use or reuse government data if there is no 
reliable licensing or clear legal arrangement governing it.26  Tim Berners-
Lee, inventor of the Internet, provided a Five-Star Scheme to evaluate the 
degree of dataset reusability.27  The scheme’s initial One-Star level sets the 
most fundamental requirement for OGD, which is that data should be 
accessible online under an open license.28  However, this scheme neither 
illustrates what is an appropriate open license for OGD nor explains why 
an open license matters for OGD. 
This Article focuses on legal issues associated with OGD licenses.  
Different government agencies with different policy goals have set 
different licensing terms to release their data.29  These licensing terms 
 
at ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/571281/140723socialimpactofopendata.pdf (addressing 
the relationship between Big Data and OGD from the perspective of U.S. Federal Trade Commission). 
19. See, e.g., LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 28–31. 
20. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 183–95, 232; Micah Altman et al., Towards a Modern 
Approach to Privacy-Aware Government Data Releases, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1967, 2005, 2048–59 
(2015); Hardy & Maurushat, supra note 1, at 34; Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Open Government: The 
Privacy Imperative, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION 
IN PRACTICE 315 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010); Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2086–
93, 2107–14, 2125–29; Mashael Khayyat & Frank Bannister, Open Data Licensing: More Than Meets 
the Eye, 20 INFO. POL’Y 231, 244–45 (2015); Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 4, at 22, 26; LEE ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 63–65; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 43. 
21. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 87–89, 125; Jeffrey D. Rubenstein, Hacking FOIA: 
Requests to Drive Government Innovation, in BEYOND TRANSPARENCY: OPEN DATA AND THE FUTURE 
OF CIVIL INNOVATION 81 (Brett Goldstein & Lauren Dyson eds., 2013); Gurin, supra note 18, at 700–
01; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 419–23; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 21; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 
4–5, 37. 
22. Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 4, at 22. 
23. See generally David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. 160 (2009) (arguing that the private sector, commercial or nonprofit organizations, rather than 
the government, is better suited to deliver OGD). 
24. See, e.g., Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 37. 
25. See, e.g., Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 232; see also Janssen, supra note 1, at 452 
(noting that quite a few French governments had been struggling with licensing policies toward OGD). 
26. Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 11. 
27. Michael Hausenblas & James J. Kim, 5 STAR OPEN DATA, available at 5stardata.info/en/ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
28. Id. 
29. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND 
REFORM IN IRELAND, OPEN DATA LICENCES 9 (2015), available at per.gov.ie/wp-content/uplo 
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reflect policy considerations that differ from those contemplated in 
business transactions or shared in typical commons scenarios, such as free 
or open source software communities.30  They also concern some 
fundamental IP issues that are not covered by, or analyzed in depth in, the 
current literature.  The aim of this Article is to provide a comprehensive 
legal analysis of open data licenses.  This study argues that the choice and 
design of an open data license forms an important element of a 
government’s information policy.  Part I introduces the concept and 
characteristics of OGD, which emphasizes citizens’ easy and timely access 
to government data.  The features associated with OGD have begun to form 
an increasingly universal principle adhered to around the world.  Part II 
identifies the primary policy goals of OGD, which include the enhancement 
of governmental transparency, accountability, public participation, the 
improvement of democracy and public service quality, and the 
advancement of innovation and economic development.  These policy 
goals should be the deciding factors in the design and choice of license.  
Part III explores the most prevalent or notable standardized open data 
licenses adopted by governments worldwide.  These licenses were drafted 
by Creative Commons, Open Data Commons, and the British government. 
A brief analysis of the terms of these licenses is also provided therein.  Part 
IV examines the major legal issues pertaining to the licensing of OGD.  As 
a large portion of government data is factual information automatically 
generated by machines or software, it fails to meet the originality standard 
and thus cannot be protected by copyright.  Consequentially, the licensing 
of such public domain data becomes legally contentious, especially in 
jurisdictions that do not provide sui generis protection of databases.  
Moreover, Part IV discusses the attribution provision, which is the most 
common restriction in OGD licenses.  Based on theories of moral right, 
Part IV also explains the rationale behind attribution provisions and non-
endorsement provisions in open data licenses.  Part V concludes. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF OPEN DATA 
 
OGD, sometimes referred to as open public sector information (PSI),31 
represents policies or practices that make data held by the public sector 
digitally available and accessible for reuse or redistribution for free or at a 
 
ads/Open-Data-Licence-Consultation-Paper-February-2015.docx; Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra  note 4, 
at 26;  Mewhort, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
30. See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of 
Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 50–53 (2009); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, 
The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 925–26 (2008). 
31. Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 4, at 17. 
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nominal cost.32  According to the European Union (EU) Directive on the 
Re-Use of Public Sector Information, “[o]pen data policies . . . encourage 
the wide availability and re-use of public sector information for private or 
commercial purposes, with minimal or no legal, technical, or financial 
constraints.”33  Commentators may link the open data movement to other 
similar movements in which information is liberalized and widely 
disseminated by digital technologies and the Internet.34  Those movements 
include open access, open educational resources, open standard, and 
free/open source software initiatives.35 
A number of organizations and individuals have provided their own 
definitions of, or criteria for, open data.  For example, a working group led 
by Carl Malamud first attempted to set eight principles for open data in 
December 2007; these principles include: (1) complete; (2) primary; (3) 
timely; (4) accessible; (5) machine processable; (6) non-discriminatory; (7) 
non-proprietary; and (8) license-free.36  Open Knowledge International 
(OKI), a nonprofit network advocating for free access to, and the sharing 
of, information globally, defines open data as “data that can be freely used, 
re-used and redistributed by anyone—subject only, at most, to the 
requirement to attribute and [sic] sharealike.”37  According to OKI’s 
definition, there should be no discrimination against the different uses of 
government data.38  Therefore, “‘non-commercial’ restrictions that would 
prevent ‘commercial’ use, or restrictions of use for certain purposes (e.g., 
only in education), are not allowed.”39  Moreover, the Sunlight Foundation 
 
32. See, e.g., Hardy & Maurushat, supra note 1, at 30; TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 95; 
GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND REFORM IN IRELAND, supra 
note 29, at 4; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 6; see also GURIN, supra note 4, at 9 (“Open Data can best be 
described as accessible public data that people, companies, and organizations can use to launch new 
ventures, analyze patterns and trends, make data-driven decisions, and solve complex problems”); 
Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2075 (“[o]pen government data refers to data released by public sector 
bodies, in a manner that is legally and technically re-usable”).  But see Luca Leone, Open Data and Food 
Law in the Digital Era: Empowering Citizens Through ICT Technology, 10 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 
356, 358 (2015) (claiming that there is no generally accepted definition of open data or OGD). 
33. Directive 2013/37/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, 2013 
O.J. (L 175) 1, 1 Amending Directive 2003/98/EC on the Re-Use of Public Sector Information, 2003 
O.J. (L 345), 90 [hereinafter EU Amending Directive on Re-Use of PSI]. 
34. See, e.g., Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 187–88; see also Sanz, supra note 8, at 3–5, 8–11 
(describing a series of openness movements enabled by the internet, including the free/open source 
software movement, and their relations to OGD). 
35. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 12–13, 93; Scassa, supra note 4, at 1779–80; Yu & 
Robinson, supra note 6, at 187–88; see also Weinstein & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that 
OGD represents “a new alignment of open source and transparency”). 
36. Joshua Tauberer, The Annotated 8 Principles of Open Government Data, 
OPENGOVDATA.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007) available at opengovdata.org/; TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 187–88; 
Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 342; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 8. 
37. Open Knowledge International, What is Open Data, OPEN DATA HANDBOOK, available at 
open datahandbook.org/guide/en/what-is-open-data/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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also published its Open Data Policy Guidelines to illustrate OGD best 
practices.40  The International Open Data Charter, which is based on the G8 
Open Data Charter, identifies six principles of open data: (1) open by 
default; (2) timely and comprehensive; (3) accessible and usable; (4) 
comparable and interoperable; (5) for improved governance and citizen 
engagement; and (6) for inclusive development and innovation.41  In sum, 
other than being timely, comprehensive, and openly accessible,42 below are 
two other noteworthy principles supported by most open data advocates: 
 
OPEN BY DEFAULT 
 
Many believe that it is a general principle that government data 
should be openly and freely available online, whereas the non-disclosure of 
government data should be an exception.  A government’s proactive 
disclosure of data is essential to its transparency and democratic 
governance.43  In other words, governments shall open their data by default 
unless there is a compelling reason, such as national security or privacy 
protection, to keep the data confidential.44  This principle is recognized in the 
G8 Open Data Charter45 and in the open data policies of the European Union 
and the UK.46  It can also be found in New York City’s Technical Standards 
Manual, which states that “[a]ll public data sets must be considered open 
unless they contain information designated as sensitive, private, or 
confidential as defined by the Citywide Data Classification Policy or 
information that is exempt pursuant to the Public Officers Law, or any other 




Government data should be made available in formats for all types of 
use.48  The data should be in formats that are machine readable, 
downloadable, usable, and distributable.49  Such formats are typically open 
 
40. Open Data Policy Guidelines, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, available at sunlightfounda 
tion.com/opendataguidelines/#proactive-release (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
41. Principles, OPEN DATA CHARTER, available at opendatacharter.net/principles/ (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter, Open Data Charter, Principles]. 
42. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 98–99, 115; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 8–9, 24. 
43. Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2084. 
44. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 219. 
45. Open Data Charter, Principles, supra note 41. 
46. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 219. 
47. New York City Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications, City 
Policies, NYC OPENDATA TECHNICAL STANDARDS MANUAL (2012), available at cityofnew 
york.github.io/opendatatsm/citypolicies.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
48. TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 99. 
49. See, e.g., Raines, supra note 5, at 324; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 24. 
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or non-proprietary industrial protocols and formats.50  Put differently, “[a]n 
open format is one that is platform independent, machine readable, and 
made available to the public without restrictions that would impede the re-
use of that information.”51 Extensible Markup Language (XML) is an 
example of open format enabling interoperability of data from diverse 
sources.52 
In Tim Berners-Lee’s Five-Star Open Data Scheme, “using non-
proprietary formats” is at the Three-Star level.53  An open format can 
effectively promote the analysis and reuse of government data.54  The 
Obama Administration endorsed releasing government data in “computer-
readable” forms.55  Similarly, the Open Government Declaration, the 
United States and seven other signatory countries committed in September 
2011 to “provide high-value information, including raw data, in a timely 
manner, in formats that the public can easily locate, understand and use, 
and in formats that facilitate reuse.”56 
 
II. Policy Goals Underlying Open Data 
 
OGD brings important social, economic, and democratic value to 
society.57  Likewise, it can promote both public and private interests.58  An 
EU Directive on the Re-Use of Public Sector Information further highlights 
the value of open data policies:  
Open data policies . . . which promote the circulation of 
information not only for economic operators but also for the 
public, can play an important role in kick-starting the 
development of new services based on novel ways to 
combine and make use of such information, stimulate 
economic growth and promote social engagement.59  
 
50. TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 99; see also Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First 
Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1067 (noting 
that efforts to control format in the OGD settings are fading). 
51. PETER R. ORSZAG, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM NO. M-10-06, OPEN 
GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE 2 (2009), available at treasury.gov/open/Documents/m10-06.pdf. 
52. See, e.g., Leone, supra note 32, at 358. 
53. Hausenblas & Kim, supra note 27. 
54. TAUBERER, supra note 1, 100–01. 
55. Technology, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVE, available at obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
issues/ technology (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
56. Open Government Declaration, OPEN GOV’T P’SHIP (Sept. 2011), available at opengov 
partnership.org/siteswww.opengovpartnership.org/files/page_files/OGP_Declaration.pdf.  
57. See, e.g., Pater Conradie & Sunli Choenni, On the Barrier for Local Government Releasing 
Open Data, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 10, 10 (2014). 
58. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 218. 
59. EU Amending Directive on Re-Use of PSI, supra note 33. 
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Open data is tasked with changing the way people run governments 
and do business via freely available government data.60  Therefore, the aim 
of OGD policies is to build an ecosystem with multiple functions.  
Identifying policy goals for OGD and setting priorities are also critically 
important for the design of data governance and relevant legal structures, 
including licenses.  Here in part two, we briefly analyze the policy goals 
underlying OGD.    
 
Transparency and Accountability 
 
OGD promotes the transparency of government and the policymaking 
process, which underpins accountability and democracy.61  Transparency 
involves the disclosure of actions taken by the public sector.62  Government 
data can definitely shed light on government activities.  Some government 
data, such as that pertaining to public spending, distribution of revenue, and 
subsidy, is critically important for government accountability.63  Therefore, 
by enabling the monitoring of government activities, open data can help 
reduce corruption.64  The Obama Administration has identified its open 
data policy goal as increasing transparency, participation, and 
collaboration,65 which will eventually advance the quality and efficiency of 
the services provided by the government.66  Likewise, the French 
government’s OGD policy aims to promote government accountability and 
make good use of the “collective intelligence of its citizens.”67  The 
Australian government similarly acknowledged how public access and the 
reuse of government information could enhance public participation and 
 
60. GURIN, supra note 4, at 9. 
61. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND 
REFORM IN IRELAND, supra note 29, at 4; Keiran Hardy & Alana Maurushat, supra note 1, at 33; 
TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 132; Chui et al., supra note 18, at 163–64; Janssen, supra note 1, at 446; 
Leone, supra note 32, at 356, 358; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 413; Scassa, supra note 4, at 
1760; Veljković et al., supra note 5, at 280; Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 196–97; Zuiderwijk & 
Janssen, supra note 4, at 17; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 4, 11–12; Weinstein & Goldstein, supra note 5, at 
46; see also Judith Bannister, Open Government: From Crown Copyright to the Creative Commons and 
Culture Change, 34 U. N. S. WALES L.J. 1080, 1089 (stating that open access to government 
information improves transparent decision making and the quality of democracy); Peixoto, supra note 
6, at 202, 207 (arguing that open date enables transparency, which may lead to accountability). 
62. Peixoto, supra note 6, at 203. 
63. Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2083. 
64. See, e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 416; Starting an Open Data Initiative, WORLD 
BANK, available at opendatatoolkit.worldbank.org/en/starting.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
65. Borgesius et al., at 2083–84; Sanz, supra note 8, at 10. 
66. Keiran Hardy & Alana Maurushat, supra note 1, at 32; ORSZAG, supra note 51, at 1; Scassa, 
supra note 4, at 1760; Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 196, 201; Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 4, 
at 17; see also Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2085–86 (illustrating how open data promotes public 
sector efficiency and improves the quality of public service); Peixoto, supra note 6, at 202 (arguing that 
OGD enables participation, which fosters better services and policies). 
67. Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2083. 
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democracy.68  The World Bank stated that open data “encourages greater 
citizen participation in government affairs” and “supports democratic 
societies.”69  Therefore, OGD has been viewed as a tool to advance public 
scrutiny, political accountability,70 participation, and the quality of 
government services. In return, all of these benefits will improve the 




OGD has been viewed as a crucial strategy to build a “data-driven 
economy.”72  The immense volume and diversity of government data may 
bring great commercial value to enterprises.73  Put more clearly, OGD is an 
abundant free resource that fuels a wide range of new innovative products, 
apps, services, and business models associated with data reuse and 
analysis.74  Additional value is then created “by means of crowdsourcing, 
user tracking, and data analytics.”75  Various commercial uses of 
government data may further encourage economic development.76  In other 
words, a properly designed OGD policy can unlock the value of PSI to the 
public sector.77  On May 9, 2013, when the US Office of Management and 
Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced the 
Open Data Policy, President Obama signed an Executive Order to promote 
OGD and stated that 
[Open data can] fuel more private sector innovation . . . .  And 
talented entrepreneurs are doing some pretty amazing things 
with it . . . .  Starting today, we’re making even more 
 
68. Bannister, supra note 61, 1091–92. 
69. World Bank, supra note 64.  
70. Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 182. 
71. Open Data Charter, Principles, supra note 41. 
72. Leone, supra note 32, at 358. 
73. See, e.g., Leone, supra note 32, at 356; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 413; Scassa, 
supra note 4, at 1773–74 (describing the commercial value of transit data); Gurin, supra note 18, at 
693–96. 
74. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 23–35, 218–19; Chui et al., supra note 18, at 163, 168; 
Janssen, supra note 1, at 446; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 416; see also Conradie & Choenni, 
supra note 57, at 10 (stating that “the release of [government] data for a broader use may give a boost to 
the creative industry, which in return leads to innovative applications and techniques”). 
75. Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open 
Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1028 (2015). 
76. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND 
REFORM IN IRELAND, supra note 29, at 4; Scassa, supra note 4, at 1760–61; Zuiderwijk & Janssen, 
supra note 4, at 17; see also GURIN, supra note 4, at 217 (stating that open government datasets “can 
have a powerful impact for the public good and economic growth”); Gianluca Misuraca, et al., Policy-
Making 2.0: Unleashing the Power of Big Data for Public Governance, in OPEN GOVERNMENT: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 171, 171 (Mila Gascó-Hernández ed., 
2014) (describing the benefit brought by OGD in the commercial field). 
77. See, e.g., Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2080. 
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government data available online, which will help launch 
even more new startups.  And we’re making it easier for 
people to find the data and use it, so that entrepreneurs can 
build products and services we haven’t even imagined yet.78 
The European Commission (EC) also highlighted the potential for 
significant economic gains to come from OGD.79  Similarly, both the UK80 
and Australian81 governments have stated that OGD could greatly benefit 
the economy.  A number of studies have estimated that the economic value 
brought by OGD will exceed hundreds of millions, or even trillions, of 
dollars.82  For example, the McKinsey Global Institute estimated that open 
data can unlock an economic value of $3–5 trillion a year across seven 
sectors in the US.83  In summary, OGD can form an important part of a 
government’s economic policy when it comes to fostering innovation and 
economic development.  
III. Standardized Licenses for OGD 
 
Some OGD advocates believe that true open data should be free from 
license restrictions;84 others claim that without specific open licenses, it is 
too costly for users to search and negotiate with data publishers.85  For 
those who believe licenses are necessary for OGD, the consensus is that the 
licenses, or terms and conditions, should facilitate optimal access to the 
underlying data.86  Government agencies may choose click-use or 
standardized licenses, such as a Creative Commons (CC) license,87 or 
 
78. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 3. 
79. Zuiderwijk & Janssen, supra note 4, at 17. 
80. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 9; NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 6; Janssen, supra note 1, at 451. 
81. Bannister, supra note 61, at 1091. 
82. See, e.g., Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2082; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 18–19; Chui 
et al., supra note 18, at 166; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 424; Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 15. 
83. McKinsey Global Institute, Open Data: Unlocking Innovation and Performance with Liquid 
Information, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Oct. 2013), available at mckinsey.com/business-functions/busin 
ess-technology/our-insights/open-data-unlocking-innovation-and-performance-with-liquid-information. 
84. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 106, 144–45; Yu & Robinson, supra note 6, at 196; 
see also Yochai Benkler, Book Review: Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons 
in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1551 (2013) (claiming that OGD is subject to no 
constraint). 
85. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND 
REFORM IN IRELAND, supra note 29, at 6; see also Federico Morando, Legal Interoperability: Making 
Open Government Data Compatible with Businesses and Communities, 4 ITALIAN J. LIBR. ARCHIVES & 
INFO. SCI. 441, 442 (2013) (introducing the viewpoint that “the distribution of data also requires . . . 
licensing”). 
86. Ruth Okediji, Government as Owners of Intellectual Property? Considerations for Public 
Welfare in the Era of Big Data, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 336 (2016). 
87. See, e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 439; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 67. 
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develop their own licensing terms.88  The primary advantage of using 
standardized licenses is to save costs associated with creating a bespoke 
license, to achieve order and efficiency, and to achieve interoperability 
between licenses.89  In this section, we introduce the most common public 





Creative Commons (CC) is a nonprofit organization that enables users 
to donate their works to the public domain or to freely license their works 
under certain conditions.90  CC provides a suite of standardized copyright 
licenses and has been playing an important role in the global movement 
advocating for information sharing and reuse.91  CC licenses have always 
been an option for OGD policies.92  In the “Guidelines on Recommended 
Standard Licences, Datasets and Charging for the Reuse of Documents,” 
the European Commission recommended CC BY and CC0 for OGD: 
Open standard licences, for example the most recent 
Creative Commons (CC) licences (version 4.0), could allow 
the re-use of PSI without the need to develop and update 
custom-made licences at the national or sub-national level. 
Of these, the CC0 public domain dedication is of particular 
interest.93 




88. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Terms of Services, OPEN FDA (Mar. 22, 
2014), available at open.fda.gov/terms/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
89. See, e.g., Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 238; Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 
434; NAOMI KORN & CHARLES OPPENHEIM, LICENSING OPEN DATA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 4 (ver. 2.0 
June 2011), available at discovery.ac.uk/files/pdf/Licensing_Open_Data_A_Practical_Guide.pdf; see 
also Mewhort, supra note 6, at 2, 9–10 (noting the benefit of interoperability brought by CC licenses). 
90. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 283–84 (2003); ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 86 (2011); Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: 
Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
359, 382 (201); Jyh-An Lee, The Greenpeace of Cultural Environmentalism, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 
12–13 (2010). 
91. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
182–83 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 276–79 (2008); Armstrong, supra note 90, at 383–84; Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public 
Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 759 (2013); Lee, supra note 90, at 13. 
92. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 89 (describing that San Francisco’s open data law 
requiring “generic license” such as a CC license). 
93. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences, Datasets and 
Charging for the Reuse of Documents, 2014 O.J. (C 240) 1, 1, § 2.2 [hereinafter Commission Notice, 
Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences]. 
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Creative Commons Licenses 
 
CC licenses provide copyright owners with the option of making 
creative works available for reproduction, distribution, and other use by 
granting some exceptions to copyright law.94  CC licenses used to cover 
only copyrighted works,95 but started to cover database rights after version 
4.0 was released in 2013.  CC licenses consist of one or more of the 
following four main elements: (1) Attribution (BY) requires the licensee to 
give credit to the licensor; (2) NonCommercial (NC) prohibits licensees 
from using the work for commercial purposes; (3) NoDerivatives (ND) 
forbids the licensee from adapting the work; and (4) ShareAlike (SA) 
requires licensees to license the adapted works under the same CC 
licenses.96  Based on these four elements, CC offers six combination 
licenses: (1) CC-BY; (2) CC-BY-SA; (3) CC-BY-NC; (4) CC-BY-ND; (5) 
CC-BY-NC-SA; and (6) CC-BY-NC-ND.97  
CC-BY, the least restrictive CC license, is currently the most popular 
standardized license among EU Member States.98  The Australian 
government also uses CC-BY to release its data as default.99  Users may 
use the data for commercial or non-commercial purpose as long as they 
provide attribution.100  Some government agencies in Australia adopt more 
restrictive CC license that prevents users from making derivative works 
and/or commercial uses.101  The New Zealand Government Open Access 
and Licensing framework (NZGOAL) likewise recommended CC-BY 







94. See, e.g., JYH-AN LEE, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS 37 
(2012). 
95. Andres Guadamuz & Diane Cabell, Data Mining in UK Higher Education Institutions: Law 
and Policy, 4 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 3, 20 (2014). 
96. Licensing Types, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/licen 
sing-types-examples/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
97. Licenses and Examples, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/share-your-
work/licensing-types-examples/licensing-examples/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
98. GOVERNMENT REFORM UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND REFORM IN 
IRELAND, supra note 29, at 9. 
99. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 109; Bannister, supra note 61, at 1099–1100; Okediji, 
supra note 86, at 353–54; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 69–70; Mewhort, supra note 6, at 3. 
100. See Okediji, supra note 86, at 350, 353–54. 
101. See Bannister, supra note 61, at 1100–01. 
102. See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT OPEN ACCESS AND 
LICENSING FRAMEWORK (NZGOAL) 9 (Dec. 2014), https://www.ict.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/NZGOAL-
Version-2.pdf; TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 108–09; LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 69; Mewhort, supra 
note 6, at 3. 
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CC0 
 
CC0 is not a license per se.103  Rather, CC0 is a statement 
surrendering copyright and related rights, such as database rights, 
worldwide and permanently.104  If the waiver is not legally effective for any 
reason, CC0 acts as a license, granting everyone an unconditional, 
irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty free license to use the work.105  Some 
open data advocates believe that CC0 is the best tool to release government 
data.106  The government of the Netherlands has launched a website which 
uses CC0 to waive the copyright on government data.107  The Norwegian 
government also adopted CC0 to open its data.108  Although CC0 is not a 





A Public Domain Mark (PDM) is a mark provided by CC.110  PDM’s can 
be used to mark and tag content that is already in the public domain and is 
not subject to any copyright restriction.111  The nature of PDM is more akin 
to a declaration than a contract. PDM is different from CC0. The former 
can be used by anyone for works that are in the public domain; whereas the 
latter is intended to be used by copyright holders or other related right 
 
103. See. e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 110.  But see Christopher S. Brown, Comment, 
Copyleft, The Disguised Copyright: Why Legislative Copyright Reform Is Superior to Copyleft 
Licenses, 78 UMKC L. REV. 749, 774 (2010) (suggesting that the mechanism of CC0 is “more of a 
license” than PDM introduced in subsection II.A.3 below); Emily Hudson & Robert Burrell, 
Abandonment, Copyright and Orphaned Works: What Does It Mean to Take the Proprietary Nature of 
Intellectual Property Rights Seriously?, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 971, 996 (2011) (viewing CC0 as a 
license); Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 240 (defining CC0 as a license). 
104. CC0 Use for Data, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/ 
CC0_use_for_data (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
105. CC0 1.0 Universal, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at creativecommons.org/publicdomain/ 
zero/1.0/legal code (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
106. See, e.g., TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 110; Janssen, supra note 1, at 451. 
107. Mike, New Dutch Government Portal Uses CC0 Public Domain Waiver as Default 
Copyright Status, CREATIVE COMMONS (Mar. 31, 2010), available at creativecommons.org/ 
2010/03/31/new-dutch-government-portal-uses-cc0-public-domain-waiver-as-default-copyright-status/; 
Case Studies/ Netherlands Government, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at wiki.creativecommons. 
org/wiki/Case_Studies/Netherlands_Government (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
108. Mewhort, supra note 6, at 16. 
109. See, e.g., Janssen, supra note 1, at 454; Mewhort, supra note 6, at 2; Joshua Tauberer et al., 
Open Government Data: Best-Practices Language for Making Data “License-Free”, @UNITEDSTATES 
PROJECT (Dec. 12, 2013), available at theunitedstates.io/licensing/. 
110. Public Domain Mark 1.0, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at creativecommons.org/ 
publicdomain /mark/1.0/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
111. Public Domain Mark, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at creativecommons.org/share-your-
work/ public-domain/pdm/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
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holders for their underlying proprietary works.112  In addition, CC0 
transforms proprietary content into content in the public domain, whereas 
PDM does not change the legal status of materials that are already in the 
public domain.113 
 
OPEN DATA COMMONS 
 
The Open Data Commons (ODC) project, under the Open Knowledge 
Foundation, has been sponsored by an information management company, 
Talis, to provide legal tools for sharing data.114  The project was initiated by 
Jordan Hatcher and Professor Charlotte Waelde in 2007 with the aim of 
providing standardized licenses for a sui generis database right in EU 
countries because CC 3.0 did not cover database rights at that time. 115  
ODC created three solutions specifically for data, datasets, and databases: 
 
1. Open Data Commons Attribution License (ODC-BY) 
An ODC-BY license covers both database right and copyright.116  
Similar to CC-BY, the only requirement of the licensee is that the licensee 
shall attribute any public use of the database, or works produced from the 
database, in the manner specified in the license.117  
2. Open Data Commons Open Database License (ODbL) 
Like all ODC licenses, ODbL includes database right and copyright.118 
However, ODbL imposes more restrictions on licensees.  Like CC-BY-SA, 
ODbL has a share-alike requirement that obliges the licensee to adopt the 
same license for the adapted database or adapted works created by the 
licensee.119  Additionally, if the licensee redistributes the database or 
 
112. PDM FAQ, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/PDM_FAQ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g., Lucie Guibault & Thomas Margoni, Analysis of Licensing Issues, in SAFE TO BE 
OPEN: STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF RESEARCH DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCESS AND 
USAGE 154 (Lucie Guibault & Andreas Wiebe eds., 2013); Guadamuz & Cabell, supra note 95, at 17; 
Morando, supra note 85, at 444–45; Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 238; Jordan Hatcher, 
Implementing Open Data: The Open Data Commons Project, TECH. INNOVATION & MGMT. REV. (Feb. 
2008), http://timreview.ca/article/122. 
115. Marinos Papadopoulos & Charalampos Bratsas, Openness/Open Access for Public Sector 
Information and Works—The Creative Commons Licensing Model 12 (European Public Sector 
Information Platform, Topic Report No. 2015/06, June 2015), available at europeandataportal. 
eu/sites/default/files/2015_open_access_for_public_sector_information_and_works.pdf. 
116. Open Data Commons Attribution License (ODC-By) v1.0, OPEN DATA COMMONS, available 
at opendatacommons.org/licenses/by/1.0/. (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Open Data Commons, 
ODC-By v1.0]. 
117. Id. 
118. Open Database License (ODbL) v1.0, OPEN DATA COMMONS, available at opendata 
commons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Open Data Commons, ODbL]. 
119. Id. 
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creates an adapted version with technological measures on it, he or she 
must redistribute a version without such measures in place.120 
3.Public Domain Dedication License (PDDL) 
PDDL is a standardized waiver of copyright and database right.121 
PDDL is CC0’s counterpart in the ODC project.122  Similar to CC0, if 
PDDL is not legal (for any reason), it serves as a public license without any 
restrictions.123  PDDL has been adopted by the City of Surrey in Canada to 
release its data.124 
 
UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
INFORMATION (UKGLF) 
 
Some governments design the public licenses for their own 
government data. For example, France has developed the License 
Ouverte,125 Germany created Datenlizenz Deutschland,126 and Italy adopted 
the Italian Open Data License.127  The British government has developed 
the UK Government Licensing Framework for Public Sector Information 
(UKGLF) to license “the use and re-use of public sector information both 
in central government and the wider public sector.”128  The UKGLF 
provides three licensing schemes for government data, which might be the 
most notable OGD licenses drafted by the government: 
1. The Open Government Licence (OGL), which permits 
“free use and re-use for all purposes, both commercial and non-
commercial”.129 
2. The Non-Commercial Government Licence, which applies 
to “free use and re-use for non-commercial purposes only”.130  




121. ODC Public Domain Dedication and License (PDDL), OPEN DATA COMMONS, available at 
opendatacommons.org/licenses/pddl/1.0/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Open Data Commons, 
PDDL]. 
122. For information regarding CC0 see text accompanying note 104; Guibault & Margoni, supra 
note 114, at 155; Mewhort, supra note 6, at 16. 
123. Open Data Commons, PDDL, supra note 121. 
124. Mewhort, supra note 6, at 2, 16. 
125. See, e.g., Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, at 241; Licence Ouverte Open Licence, 
ETALAB, available at etalab.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Open_Licence.pdf (last visited Mar. 
15, 2017); Open Licence (French), WIKIPEDIA, available at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_licence_ 
(French) (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
126. See, e.g., LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 69. 
127. See, e.g., Janssen, supra note 1, at 452; Mockus & Palmirani, supra note 145, at 293–94. 
128. NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 4. 
129. Id.  
130. Id. 
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3.The Charged Licence, “where charges are made for the re-
use of information.”131  Different from other public licenses for 
OGD, the Charged Licence allows for payment to be made by 
users or licensees.  However, governments can only charge for 
overhead for producing the document.132 
OGL, which is similar to a CC-BY or ODC-BY license, is the default 
license of UKGLF.133  In other words, a general principle in the United 
Kingdom is that government data should be freely available for both 
commercial and noncommercial purposes as long as attribution is given.  
As a result, OGL has been embraced by quite a few ministerial and local 
government agencies.134  Different from CC and ODC-BY licenses, OGL 
addresses “Crown copyright,”135 which is tailored for the UK copyright 
regime.136  
 
Analysis of the Terms 
 
The open licenses introduced above share a number of similarities. 
Excepting CC0, PDM, and PDDL, all other licenses require attribution.  
With the exception of a Charged Licence, licensees under other licenses 
can freely use the licensed materials.  CC-BY, ODC-BY, and OGL are the 
least restrictive licenses in which the licensors still retain their IP rights.  
ODbL has a counterpart in CC licenses, which is the CC-BY-SA license—
it has a similar share-alike requirement for licensees.137  Nonetheless, there 
are still significant differences between these two licenses.  On the one 
hand, a CC-BY-SA license simply restricts licensees from applying 
technological measures,138 whereas ODbL provides a more flexible option 
for dual licensing.139  On the other hand, ODbL only covers the database 
 
131. Id. 
132 The Re-Use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1415, § 15(2) (UK), 
available at legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1415/contents/made. 
133. NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 5, 15. 
134. Okediji, supra note 86, at 351. 
135. Some countries other than the United Kingdom, such as Australia and Canada, also have the 
Crown copyright rules governing copyright over government information.  See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Judge, 
Copyright, Access, and Integrity of Public Information, 1 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 427, 427–28 
(2008); Ann L. Monotti, Nature and Basis of Crown Copyright in Official Publications, 14(9) EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 305, 305 (1992). 
136. Open Government Licence for Public Sector Information, NAT’L ARCHIVES, available at 
nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
[Hereinafter Nat’l Archives, OGL Version 3]. 
137. Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at creativecom 
mons.org/ licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
138. Id. 
139. See supra text accompanying note 120; Open Data Commons, ODbL, supra note 118, § 4.7 
(“a. This License does not allow You to impose (except subject to Section 4.7 b.) any terms or any 
technological measures on the Database, a Derivative Database, or the whole or a Substantial part of the 
Contents that alter or restrict the terms of this License, or any rights granted under it, or have the effect 
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itself, and not its content.140  Put differently, ODbL only covers the manner 
in which the data is selected or arranged and the database as a whole; 
ODbL does not cover each individual item of data or content.  If the 
licensee would also like to license individual pieces of content, he or she 
needs to apply for another license instrument.  OpenStreetMap, an open 
source map project contributed to by volunteers,141 provides a good 
example to demonstrate the distinction between ODbL and CC-BY-SA. 
The project licenses its whole database to the public under ODbL.142  But 
when it comes to the licensing arrangement of its individual copyrighted 
map, OpenStreetMap needs to implement a CC-BY-SA license because 
ODbL does not grant a license to use the individual map in the database.143 
In addition, these OGD licenses are mostly devised with a 
compatibility provision to make the subject license compatible with other 
similar public licenses.144  Compatibility, or interoperability, between 
licenses means users can legally combine works subject to different public 
licenses together.145  License compatibility is especially important in 
scientific fields, such as environmental protection and climate change, 
where users have an urgent need to use data from sources with different 
 
or intent of restricting the ability of any person to exercise those rights. b.  Parallel distribution. You 
may impose terms or technological measures on the Database, a Derivative Database, or the whole or a 
Substantial part of the Contents (a “Restricted Database”) in contravention of Section 4.74 a. only if 
You also make a copy of the Database or a Derivative Database available to the recipient of the 
Restricted Database: i. That is available without additional fee; ii. That is available in a medium that 
does not alter or restrict the terms of this License, or any rights granted under it, or have the effect or 
intent of restricting the ability of any person to exercise those rights (an “Unrestricted Database”); and 
iii.  The Unrestricted Database is at least as accessible to the recipient as a practical matter as the 
Restricted Database.”). 
140. Open Data Commons, ODbL, supra note 118, § 2.4 (“The individual items of the Contents 
contained in this Database may be covered by other rights, including copyright, patent, data protection, 
privacy, or personality rights, and this License does not cover any rights (other than Database Rights or 
in contract) in individual Contents contained in the Database.  For example, if used on a Database of 
images (the Contents), this License would not apply to copyright over individual images, which could 
have their own separate licenses, or one single license covering all of the rights over the images.”). 
141. See generally Mordechai (Muki) Haklay & Patrick Weber, OpenstreetMap: User-Generated 
street Maps, 7(4) IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING 12 (2008); Pascal Neis & Alexander Zipf, Analyzing 
the Contributor Activity of a Volunteered Geographic Information Project — The Case of 
OpenStreetMap, 2012(1) ISPRS INT’L J. GEO-INFO. 146 (2012). 
142. See, e.g., Pascal Neis & Dennis Zielstra, Recent Developments and Future Trends in 
Volunteered Geographic Information Research: The Case of OpenStreetMap, 6(1) FUTURE INTERNET 
76, 79 (2014). 
143. Guibault & Margoni, supra note 114, at 158. 
144. See, e.g., Open Data Commons, ODbL, supra note 118, § 4.4(e); Mewhort, supra note 6, at 
3, 20–21 (noting that the British Open Government Licence was intentionally crafted to be compatible 
with CC licenses). 
145. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 103, at 772–74; Lee, supra note 90, at 32–33; Martynas 
Mockus & Monica Palmirani, Open Government Data Licensing Framework, in ELECTRONIC 
GOVERNMENT AND THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE: 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, 
EGOVIS 2015 287, 290–92 (Andrea Kő & Enrico Francesconi eds., 2015); Morando, supra note 85, at 
445–48. 
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licenses.146  Because public licenses and declarations aim to facilitate 
greater distribution and reuse of the subject materials, the public licenses 
introduced above all include a compatibility provision so that users can 
legally combine content licensed under different licenses.147  
To continue our analysis of various licensing terms, we focus below 
on issues of charges, restrictions on data usage, and the waiver of moral 




Public licenses, such as those provided by CC and Open Data 
Commons, typically promote free sharing and use of materials.148  
Therefore, users or licensees do not need to pay for the licensed materials.  
Free of charge is normally a general principle found in OGD policies.  For 
example, the New Zealand government made it clear in its NZGOAL that 
the “[c]harging by State Services agencies for people’s use and re-use of 
copyrighted works and non-copyright materials is generally 
discouraged.”149  Among all the OGD licenses and statements mentioned 
above, only the UK’s Charged Licence charges users to use government 
data.  A reasonable explanation for such a difference is that the Charged 
Licence was designed by the government and the government has certain 
practical considerations to reflect on, including the cost of implementing 
open data policies. It should also be noted that the UK government has 
deliberately placed two restrictions on the adoption of the Charged 
Licence: (1) this license is an exception; and (2) charges should be limited 
to the costs arising from “the re-use of information.”150 
Charging a reasonable fee for the use of government data is also 
permitted in the EU PSI Directive.  According to the Directive, the fee is 
limited to “the marginal costs incurred for their reproduction, provision and 
dissemination,” and the charges “shall not exceed the cost of collection, 
production, reproduction and dissemination, together with a reasonable 
return on investment.”151  Although both the Charged Licence and the EU 
PSI Directive allow charging for the use of government data, the EU PSI 
Directive conflicts with the public interest concerns of OGD policy.  The 
Directive permits using open data as a tool to collect “a reasonable return 
on investment” other than “the cost of collection, production, reproduction 
 
146. See, e.g., Estelle Derclaye, The Role of Copyright in the Protection of Environment and the 
Fight Against Climate Change: Is the Current Copyright System Adequate?, 5(2) WIPO J. 152, 156–58 
(2014). 
147. See, e.g., Nat’l Archives, OGL Version 3, supra note 136.  
148. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 90, at 365–68; Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on 
Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 800–01 (2006). 
149. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, supra note 102, at 16. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
151. EU Amending Directive on Re-Use of PSI, supra note 33, art. 6., at 12. 
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and dissemination.”152  However, since the policy’s goal is to promote 
transparency, accountability, participation, and economic development,153 
open data should not be used as a finance tool to benefit the government.154  
Therefore, the charges provision in the PSI Directive is obviously not the 
best practice for OGD policy. 
 
2. Restrictions on the Use of Data 
 
In order to maximize the use of government data, a substantial 
segment of the open data community suggests that licensing terms should 
be the least restrictive or subject to minimal constraints.155  Nevertheless, 
“minimal constraint” does not mean no constraints at all.156  Accordingly, it 
becomes an issue as to what constitutes “minimal constraint” when the 
policy goal is to maximize the use of government data. Attribution is the 
most common restriction in public licenses.157  Other than attribution, the 
Non-Commercial Government Licence under the UKGLF prohibits 
licensees from using or reusing the data for commercial purposes.158  Since 
fostering innovation, new business models, and economic development are 
some of the primary policy goals of OGD, such licenses as the Non-
Commercial Government Licence must be viewed as an exception. 
Otherwise, it would be impossible to launch new services or products based 
on government data at all.159  Similar criticisms have been levied against 
the Italian Open Data License for its exclusion of commercial use.160 
Moreover, the CC-BY-SA license and ODbL contain share-alike 
provisions, requiring the licensee to apply the same license to the adapted 
database or works created, as used in the original source.161  Such 
provisions originate from the GNU General Public License (GPL) used in 
free software communities, where they hope to prevent licensees from 
hiding the modified code to gain unfair advantages.162  This requirement 
prevents licensees from not giving back to the commons.163  Share-alike 
provisions thus serve the function of broadening the commons for public 
 
152. Id. 
153. See supra Part II. 
154. See, e.g., Chris Corbin, PSI Policy Principles: European Best Practice, in ACCESS TO 
PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION (VOLUME 1) 161, 167 (2010), available at ses.library.usyd.edu.au// 
bitstream/2123/6561/1/PSI_vol1_chapter8.pdf. 
155. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
156. But see Chui et al., at 164 (claiming unrestrictive rights to use government data). 
157. See infra Section IV.C. 
158. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
159. See also LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 66 (suggesting that noncommercial provision is not 
acceptable in OGD licenses).  
160. See, e.g., Janssen, supra note 1, at 452. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 137. 
162. See, e.g., Note, On Enforcing Viral Terms, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2184, 2187 (2009). 
163. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 91, at 760. 
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use.164  Nonetheless, governments have different considerations when 
licensing their data.  A share-alike provision may impede new business 
models and innovative commercial uses of government data, which will 
eventually run counter to the policy goal of promoting economic 
development.165  In other words, a share-alike duty may create unnecessary 
costs for enterprises that endeavor to develop novel products or services.  
Moreover, it is the responsibility of governments, rather than the private 
sector, to keep government data freely available. Even if the licensee does 
not honor the share-alike obligation, the same government data, dataset, or 
database is still open to the public.  Therefore, CC-BY-SA licenses and 
ODbL are probably not the best options for a wide range of government 
data if economic growth is to remain a primary policy goal for OGD. 
In summary, a government’s choice of open licensing terms is quite 
different from that of the private sector.  Businesses or communities 
usually link the choice over terms to contributors’ incentives to contribute, 
costs to provide this incentive, and the sustainability of the commons’ 
projects.166  However, such considerations may not exist in the context of 
government data that is continuously generated as a government functions.  
In other words, a government’s selection of open data licenses needs to 
reflect its policy goals, which are typically not addressed in private 
business or commons settings.    
 
3. Waiver of Moral Rights 
 
CC0 and PDDL are both waivers of copyright to the public domain. 
Surrender of copyright concerns moral rights issues in many countries.  
Although common law countries allow the waiver of moral rights,167 those 
rights are not waivable in some civil law jurisdictions, like France.168  In 
 
164. Cf. Guy Pessach, Reciprocal Share-Alike Exemptions in Copyright Law, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1245, 1257–58 (2008) (noting the benefit of legislating reciprocal ShareAlike exemptions in 
copyright law). 
165. But see LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 104 (stating that ShareAlike provisions are acceptable in 
OGD licenses). 
166. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 91, at 773–80; see also Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the 
Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 
275, 313 (noting that commons communities can sustain by using licensing terms to coordinate 
individual contributors). 
167. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common 
Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 244–45 (1995); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, 
Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
95, 124–25 (1997); Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and 
Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REV. 827, 845 (1992). 
168. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: 
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 367–68 (3d ed. 2013); Adolf Dietz, Moral Rights and the Civil Law 
Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 220–21 (1995); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions 
and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 48–49 (1994); see also Ilhyung Lee, Toward An American Moral Rights 
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other civil law jurisdictions, like Germany, moral rights can be waived 
under some circumstances.169  Both CC0 and PDDL recognize the potential 
moral rights waiver issues present in civil law jurisdictions.  However, their 
approaches differ slightly.  CC0 adopts a more ambiguous tone by not 
mentioning a moral rights waiver in either its waiver or fallback provisions:  
2. Waiver.  To the greatest extent permitted by, but not 
in contravention of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby 
overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and unconditionally 
waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer’s 
Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and 
causes of action . . . .   
3. Public License Fallback.  Should any part of the 
Waiver for any reason be judged legally invalid or 
ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver shall be 
preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into 
account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.170 
The courts may interpret the above CC0 provisions to maintain the validity 
of the waiver of economic rights alone, but not moral rights.  If the attempt 
to waive copyright fails, CC0 confers an unconditional license permitting 
free reuse of the works and a covenant not to sue.171  PDDL, on the other 
hand, copes with moral rights issues in a more sophisticated and clear 
manner.  Section 3.4.b of the PDDL states: 
If waiver of moral rights under Section 3.4 a in the relevant 
jurisdiction is not possible, Licensor agrees not to assert any 
moral rights over the Work and waives all claims in moral 
rights to the fullest extent possible by the law of the 
relevant jurisdiction under Section 6.4.172 
If we compare CC0 and PDDL in terms of a moral rights waiver, PDDL 
may provide more scope for users.  Although moral rights in some civil law 
jurisdictions are unwaivable and nontransferrable, the licensee can still 
enjoy a certain degree of freedom associated with moral rights subject to 
the license agreement.173  Therefore, a license agreement may alleviate the 
absolute unwaivable and non-transferrable moral rights in civil law 
jurisdictions.  From this perspective, PDDL is more sophisticated and 
flexible than CC0 when it comes to coping with moral rights issues.   
 
in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 803 (2001) (“[j]urisdictions with the most advanced moral 
rights protection provide that moral rights are inalienable … and thus not subject to the author's transfer 
or waiver”).  But see SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 53 (2008) 
(noting that moral rights are usually waivable in countries with those statutory rights). 
169. See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 168, at 220. 
170. CC01.0 Universal, CREATIVE COMMONS, § 2–3, available at creativecommons.org/ 
publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
171. Id. § 3. 
172. Open Data Commons, PDDL, supra note 121, § 3.4(b). 
173. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 168, at 369. 
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IV. Legal Issues Underlying Licensing Government Data 
 
Licensing government data involves a number of fundamental IP 
issues.  Some IP issues are common for the legal governance of data, 
datasets, and databases, while others are uniquely associated with the 
nature of governments or open data policies.  Below, this part discusses 
major IP issues in the government licensing of open data, which include the 
IP status of government data, the public domain nature of most government 
data, and the common attribution and non-endorsement provisions in public 
licenses. 
 
IP STATUS OF GOVERNMENT DATA 
 
Some scholars and policymakers assert that from a policy perspective, 
the works created by state employees should be in the public domain.174  
For example, the Dutch Council of State once opined that the City of 
Amsterdam could not legally impose any restriction on a company’s use of 
the City’s database because it was built with tax money.175  In other words, 
the City’s government did not own the database.  In countries like the US, 
there are statutory public domain rules that prohibit the federal government 
from copyrighting works it produces; however, governments may still own 
copyrights assigned by others.176  Even if a government can own a 
copyright, the originality standard may prevent it from owning a copyright 
over government data.177  Originality is the universal standard for copyright 
protection.178  A work needs to contain a minimum degree of creative 
authorship to be copyrightable.179  Facts, or information automatically 
generated by a machine or algorithm, cannot be protected under copyright 
 
174. Okediji, supra note 86, at 338–39; see also GURIN, supra note 4, at 9 (“governments should 
make the data they collect available to taxpayers who’ve paid to collect it”); Marcowitz-Bitton, supra 
note 2, at 415 (introducing the argument that government works “should be accessible to all, 
uninhibited by the restrains of copyright law, because the public sponsors the creation of these works 
with its tax money”); Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 40 (noting the reason of this debate is that government 
“information has been created with tax-payers’ money”).  But see Khayyat & Bannister, supra note 20, 
at 244 (rebutting the argument that taxpayers shall have free access to government generated data).  
175. Janssen, supra note 1, at 451. 
176. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“[c]opyright . . . is not available for any work of the United States 
Government”); see also Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 420 (explaining that “[t]he reason behind 17 
U.S.C. § 105 is to ensure that government information remains in the public domain in order to best 
serve the public interest); Okediji, supra note 86, 343–45 (explaining the evolution of public domain 
rule on government works in the U.S.). 
177. See, e.g., Beth Ford, Comment, Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 
546 (2014). 
178. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 168, at 194–93. 
179. See, e.g., WILLIAM CORNISH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, 
TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 435 (8th ed. 2013); see also JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A 
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 57 (3d ed. 2010) (“nearly all countries require some level of 
creativity as a prerequisite for copyright protection”).   
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because they lack originality.180  Database creators gain copyright 
protection of compilations and databases only if the selection, coordination, 
or arrangement of the contents is sufficiently original.181  However, this is 
not the case for most government data or databases which include statistics, 
census data, fiscal data, budget information, parliamentary records, election 
records, property registration, facts about school locations and 
performance, other factual information, or are created automatically by 
machine.182  In other words, government data usually lacks originality and 
therefore cannot be protected by copyright.183 
In the EU, databases can be protected by a sui generis right, which is 
independent from copyright under the European Database Protection 
Directive.184  In order to obtain the sui generis protection, the database 
owner needs to prove that a substantial investment was made in the 
database.185  The right is granted for fifteen years and allows the owner to 
control who can use the database, how the database can be used, and the 
database’s distribution.186  Therefore, it is easier for EU governments (or 
those with similar laws) to own their databases’ IP rights and therefore 
maintain more legal control over their data. Put differently, European 
governments can still use public licenses, such as CC-BY, ODC-BY, or 
ODbL, to legally license their database right even if their data is not 
copyrightable. 
 
180. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN 
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 535 (3rd ed. 2015); Scassa, supra note 4, at 1782–83, 1787–88.  
181. See. e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
182. See. e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 415; Okediji, supra note 86, at 334; see also 
TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 115 (“government data normally represents facts about the real world (who 
voted on what, environmental conditions, financial holdings)”); Borgesius et al., supra note 17, at 2094 
(noting that government data includes statistics, land registries, business registers, or earth observation 
data); Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 413 (stating that government data includes “national statistics, 
budget information, parliamentary records, data about the location of schools and their performance, 
information about crimes, election records, financial data, and more”); LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 54–
56 (noting that common high-value datasets are those of company register, insolvency and bankruptcy 
record, government contract, various statistics, and so on); Ubaldi, supra note 1, at 6, 23 (noting that 
government data consists of business information, registers, geographic information, meteorological 
information, social data on statistics, and transport information). 
183. See, e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 415; Scassa, supra note 4, at 1785–86; see also 
Paul Miller et al., Open Data Commons, A License for Open Data, (369 CEUR WORKSHOP 
PROCEEDINGS, no. 8, Apr. 22, 2008), available at ceur-ws.org/Vol-369/paper08.pdf (similarly holding 
that data, datasets, and databases are mostly not copyrightable creative works); Scassa, supra note 4, at 
1766 (stating that it is extremely difficult to identify authorship in government data). 
184. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 20, available at eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content 
/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31996L0009. 
185. Id. art. 7, at 25. 
186. Id. art. 10, at 26. 
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Data and databases may be protected as trade secrets as well.187  
However, by its very nature, trade secret protection cannot be applied to 
OGD.  Secrecy is the defining element of a trade secret.188  Once 
information is known by the public, it is no longer secret and consequently 
cannot be protected as a trade secret.189  Since transparency is one of the 
policy goals of OGD,190 such data needs to be openly accessible.191  The 
openness of government data certainly fails to fulfill the secrecy 
requirement in trade secret law.192  Therefore, it is impossible to protect 
OGD as trade secrets. 
Data holders or database owners occasionally use contract and/or 
technical restrictions to control access to their data or databases.193  It does 
not matter if the data is in the public domain because those database owners 
do not claim IP over the data or databases.  The Lexis and Westlaw 
databases are good examples of databases with restricted access to public 
information.  Both contain huge amounts of data related to court decisions 
and other legal texts that are in the public domain, but only subscribers 
have access to these databases.194  However, governments cannot use the 
same approach to control open data.  In the OGD context, digital 
technologies are used to disseminate government data,195 rather than restrict 
access to it.  Moreover, the closed nature of the Lexis and Westlaw 
databases enables better technological and contractual control. Subscribers 
 
187. See, e.g., Jennifer Askanazi et al., The Future of Database Protection in U.S. Copyright 
Law, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17, ¶15 (2001); Donna M. Gitter, Resolving The Open Source 
Paradox in Biotechnology: A Proposal for A Revised Open Source Policy for Publicly Funded Genomic 
Databases, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1475, 1513 (2007); Lionel M. Lavenue, Database Rights and Technical 
Data Rights: The Expansion of Intellectual Property for the Protection of Databases, 38 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1, 26 (1997); Angela M. Oliver, Personalized Medicine in the Information Age: Myriad’s De 
Facto Monopoly on Breast Cancer Research, 68 SMU L. REV. 537, 648–50 (2015). 
Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still A Contract: Examining the 
Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 162–63 (2005). 
188. Jonathan R. Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward A More Efficient Approach, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1283-84 (2004); Gitter, supra note 187, at 1510; see also Mark Lemley, The 
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 342–43 (2008) 
(illustrating the centrality of secrecy in trade secret law).  
189. Lavenue, supra note 187, at 3; Sandeen, at 133–34. 
190. See text accompanying note 61-71. 
191. See text accompanying note 32-47. 
192. Cf David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, (2007) (arguing that “trade secrecy must give way to traditional 
notions of transparency and accountability when it comes to the provision of public infrastructure”). 
193. Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152 (2003); see also J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually 
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property 
Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 401 (2003) (“the data that traditional copyright law 
puts into the public domain may be fenced to a still unknown extent by the technological measures”). 
194. Samuelson, supra note 193, at 152; Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 
1046 (2006). 
195. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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to the Lexis and Westlaw databases are limited and identifiable, whereas 
users of OGD are not.  As a result, it is impractical for governments to 
govern the use of open data via contractual and technical restrictions. 
In sum, government data is not protected by copyright unless it meets 
the originality standard in copyright law.  Although some government data 
is an original expression subject to copyright protection, most government 
data is not, such as statistics, factual information, or information 
automatically produced by machine or algorithm.  Governments in EU 
countries can obtain sui generis protection for their databases if they made 
a substantial investment into the creation of the databases.  However, this 
sui generis right is not available in most other jurisdictions.  As a result, 
licenses that are specifically designed to cover a database right, such as 
ODbL, are more suited to EU countries than others.196 
 
LEGAL EFFECT OF LICENSING DATA IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
Typically, works subject to open licenses are protected by copyright 
or other types of IP rights.  Accordingly, most open data licenses are 
designed based on the presumption that the subject government’s data is 
copyrighted.197  For example, the UKGLF makes it clear that it only applies 
to copyright and database rights.198  It implies that the UKGLF will not be 
applied to data that is not protected by copyright or database rights.  On the 
flip side, materials in the public domain do not require licenses to be 
released.199  Nonetheless, what if governments apply public licenses to data 
that is not protected by copyright or database rights? What would be the 
legal effect of such licenses? 
Although public licenses, such as CC licenses, can help disseminate 
copyrighted work legally, they are not required to release data that is 
already in the public domain.200  Some researchers have rightfully pointed 
out that CC licenses are not tailor-made for non-copyright materials.201  
Instead, governments may use a PDM to clarify the public domain status of 
the data.  If governments use CC0 for such data, it may not cause any 
serious legal problem, although the underlying data is not copyrighted at 
 
196. See, e.g., Mewhort, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that the UK Open Government Licence is 
more appropriate for EU countries where sui generis database rights exists). 
197. Scassa, supra note 4, at 1804; see also TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 107 (“[w]hen a work is 
copyrighted, a license is required to undo or partially undo the all-rights-reserved default rule”), and at 
144 (“[o]pen licensing…is subject to copyright protections”); Bannister, supra note 61, at 1099 
(“Creative Commons licensing movement aims to provide a standardised infrastructure for the open 
licensing of copyright protected material”). 
198. NAT’L ARCHIVES, UK GOVERNMENT LICENSING FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 6. 
199. See, e.g., Derclaye, supra note 146, at 156 (“[i]n countries where official texts are not 
protected by copyright, the issue of the need for access through licenses does not even arise”). 
200. TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 107. 
201. Korn & Oppenheim, supra note 89, at 4, 6. 
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all.  In this regard, CC0 has the advantage of providing users with more 
legal certainty because it can show the public that the affirmer is committed 
to relinquishing their IP protection, if they have it, to the broadest possible 
extent.202  Users mostly do not need to seek legal advice regarding data 
released under CC0.203  A number of US government agencies have used 
CC0 to release data or put it in the public domain.204  
Yet, applying public licenses, such as CC, to non-copyrightable or 
public-domain data is not an uncommon OGD practice.  For example, the 
Bureau of Meteorology in Australia releases weather observation datasets 
with a CC-BY 3.0 Australia license.205  This data is updated every 30 
minutes.206  However, this dataset primarily provides factual information, 
such as temperature and humidity,207 which is not copyrightable.  Similarly, 
the New Zealand government has released public holidays and anniversary 
dates, which are non-copyrightable factual information, under a CC-BY 3.0 
license.208  Consequently, these practices lead to a legal problem pertaining 
to how governments can use CC or other public licenses to release non-
copyrightable data in countries where database rights are not protected.  It 
will take further empirical study to explore why governments in non-EU 
jurisdictions tend to adopt public licenses, rather than CC0, PDM, or 
PDDL, to release public domain data.  It is possible that governments do 
not conduct due diligence regarding the legal status of the subject data.  
Based on the author’s personal experiences of providing OGD consultation 
to the public sector, it is more likely because of the governmental mentality 
regarding control over data.  Government officials may hesitate to 
recognize the public domain nature of the sorts of data over which they 
used to exert their full control.  They may not understand that although the 
government is in charge of data governance, the government cannot legally 
claim data ownership.  
From a legal perspective, it is worthwhile to explore the effects of 
these open data licenses if the underlying data is in the public domain.  
There are two possible approaches to this question.  The first interpretation 
is that the contract may become void or partly void given the subject matter 
 
202. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
203. Mewhort, supra note 6, at 17. 
204. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, U.S. OPEN DATA ACTION PLAN (2014), available at obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/us_open_data_action_plan.pdf. 
205. Bureau of Meteorology (Australia), Latest Coastal Weather Observations for Coolangatta 
(QLD), DATA.GOV AUSTRALIA, available at data.gov.au/dataset/latest-coastal-weather-observations-
for-coolangatta-qld (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
206. Id. 
207. See, e.g., Bureau of Meteorology (Australia), Latest Weather Observations for Coolangatta, 
DATA.GOV AUSTRALIA, available at bom.gov.au/products/IDQ60801/IDQ60801.94592.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
208. Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (New Zealand), Public Holidays, 
DATA.GOVT NEW ZEALAND (Aug. 26, 2016), available at data.govt.nz/dataset/show/5686 (using a CC 
“Attribution 3.0 New Zealand” license).  
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data in the contract is not owned by the licensor and is in the public 
domain.  The data should thus be free to everyone.209  If the underlying data 
is not protected under applicable law, a license is needless.210  As a result, 
asserting copyright over public domain materials may at worst be defined 
as “copyfraud,” which may stifle creativity and free speech.211  
The second possible solution is to recognize the validity of the 
agreement and treat it as a binding contract between the data holder and the 
user.  Put differently, even if there are no underlying IP rights to constitute 
a license,212 the agreement itself is still a contract that can legally oblige 
data users to fulfill attribution, share-alike, or other duties.213  This contract 
theory was criticized as imposing unnecessary restrictions on public 
domain resources.214  Even if the agreement is a valid contract, government 
agencies may not be able to enforce it against users who breach the 
contract.  Many open data agreements provide a provision that data users’ 
rights will be revoked or the agreement will be terminated automatically if 
the users do not comply with the conditions.215  This is typically the only 
legal effect of licensees’ non-compliance.  However, if this is the only legal 
effect of non-compliance, it will make no difference to noncompliant users.  
Those users can always argue that they have the intrinsic right to use data 
in the public domain even without an agreement in place. 
Enforceability has long been an issue for public licenses, such as CC 
licenses.216  Even if the open license agreement is valid and enforceable 
between the licensor and licensee, whether the data is protected by IP 
makes a big difference when the licensor enforces their legal right against a 
third party.  Public licenses, like CC licenses, are merely contracts with less 
effect than the law.217  Given the transparent nature of OGD policy, it is 
quite possible that third parties do not obtain the data directly from the 
government, but from elsewhere.  These third parties may argue that they 
are not parties to public licenses and thus are not bound by the license 
agreement.  Such risk is higher than that in a proprietary licensing scenario, 
 
209. See, e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 438. 
210. Comments on the Open Database License Proposed by Open Data Commons, CREATIVE 
COMMONS, available at sciencecommons.org/resources/readingroom/comments-on-odbl/ (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2017). 
211. Mazzone, supra note 194, at 1028–30. 
212. Cf. Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not to Sue”: Disentangling 
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1114 (2013) (noting that 
a license needs to be granted by the title holder of the property). 
213. Creative Commons, supra note 210. 
214. Id. 
215. See, e.g., Commission Notice, Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences, supra note 
93, § 2.3.6; Attribution 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, § 6, https://creativecommons. 
org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode (last visited Mar. 15, 2017); Creative Commons, Attribution-ShareAlike 
4.0 International, supra note 137, § 6; Open Data Commons, ODC-By v1.0, supra note 116, § 9.1. 
216. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 103, at 767. 
217. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 90, at 229. 
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where the number of licensees is limited.  Traditionally, even though IP 
owners cannot sue the third parties for breach of the license agreement, 
they can still claim IP infringement against them.218  Nevertheless, if the 
subject data is in the public domain, the data owners certainly do not have 





Open licenses with attribution requirements alone, such as CC-BY, 
ODC-BY, and the Open Government Licence, are generally the most 
permissive licenses.  Therefore, some commentators view these attribution-
only licenses as “quasi-public domain dedications.”219  In the Guidelines on 
Recommended Standard Licences, the European Commission proposed 
two acceptable restrictions to open data licenses, which are 
“acknowledgment of source” and “acknowledgment of any modifications 
to the document.”220  The Guidelines further explained that “any other 
obligations [than attribution] may limit licensees’ creativity or economic 
activity, thereby affecting the re-use potential of the documents in 
question.”221  In this section, the common attribution requirement in most 
OGD policies and licenses is explored and the theory of attribution in 
moral rights is used as a lens to understand the rationale behind attribution 




Almost all public licenses or open licenses contain an attribution 
requirement.222  CC0, PDM, and PDDL are probably the only three open 
data terms that do not require attribution.  Some government agencies use 
CC0 to waive all their copyright and related rights, but still require users to 
give attribution.  For example, the Terms of Service provided by the US 
 
218. See also Brown, supra note 103, at 767 (“if the user [of a CC license] cannot rely on the 
license then they will have no way to know whether their use constitutes copyright infringement”). 
219. See, e.g., Asay, supra note 91, at 760. 
220. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences, supra note 93, § 2; 
see also TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing the contractual obligation associated with 
“attribution and data integrity”). 
221. Commission Notice, Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences, supra note 93, § 
2.3.2.  
222. See e.g. Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 
GEO. L.J. 49, 90–92 (2006); Eric E. Johnson, Rethinking Sharing Licenses for the Entertainment Media, 
26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 409 (2008); Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the 
Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 59, 78–84 (2007); see also Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Creative 
Commons: America’s Moral Rights?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 905, 925 (2011) 
(noting that attribution is a fundamental condition for CC licenses). 
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) makes CC0 the default rule for open 
data while requiring users give “proper credit.”223  The legal outcome of 
such an arrangement is similar to that of adopting CC-BY or ODC-BY, 
which grants virtually all types of copyright and related rights as long as 
the licensors attribute any public use of the database, or works produced 
from the database, in the manner specified in the license.  But why does the 
FDA not apply CC-BY directly to ensure user attribution?  This practice 
would involve a fundamental inquiry into the relationship between IP and 
attribution.  Normally, right of attribution is part of moral rights.  Authors 
own copyright so that they can require users or licensees to attribute credit 
to them.  In the case of the FDA’s Terms of Service, the agency does not 
intend to claim copyright while it values users’ attributions.  It may well 
explain why government is interested in claiming ownership over non-
copyrightable materials.224  By claiming copyright ownership over data, 
governments are justified in using public licenses to entail users giving 
credit.   
Since OGD policies normally promote access to, and reuse of, data for 
free or at nominal costs,225 every restriction in the licensing terms that 
increases users’ costs needs to be justified.  Therefore, it is worth exploring 
why attribution is necessary in open data licenses.  Some researchers argue 
that the attribution requirement is the government’s instrument to control 
speech because every restriction on the use of data is a form of 
censorship.226  This argument is flawed in at least three ways: first, free 
speech as a constitutional right is still subject to some limitations;227 
second, there is no empirical evidence or theoretical support indicating that 
the attribution requirement in OGD licenses generates a chilling effect or 
any barriers to freedom of speech; and third, it is not articulated why 
governments would intend to restrict speech via the attribution 
requirement.  We can hardly imagine how a government would be able to 
use the attribution requirement to silence others from voicing opinions with 
which it disagrees. 
Some other scholars have suggested that attribution can guarantee the 
accuracy and reliability of the data provided by governments.228  
Nevertheless, such an argument may not be validated if we read through 
 
223. FDA, Terms of Services, supra note 88. 
224. See supra text accompanying note 205-208. 
225. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
226. TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 109. 
227. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 
429, 431, 436–37 (1983); Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John 
Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 
69 (2010); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free 
Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in 
Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1551, 1554–59 (2004). 
228. See, e.g., Marcowitz-Bitton, supra note 2, at 414–15. 
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government data licenses. It is quite costly to maintain the accuracy and 
precision of data.229  Poor quality has been a problem for government 
data;230 consequently, making it openly available highlights its 
incompleteness and inaccuracy. Most open data licenses include a liability 
disclaimer refusing to take responsibility for the data’s accuracy, 
correctness, or completeness.231  The data or database is licensed by the 
licensor “as is” and without any warranty of data quality.232  The disclaimer 
provision in traditional public license agreements is typically subject to IP 
infringement claimed by third parties,233 but in open data agreements, the 
disclaimer provision also excludes any legal liability associated with data 
error.  If the attribution terms in open data licenses are intended to ensure 





Although governments want proper attribution for the data they 
release, they dislike over-attribution.  One notable example is the UK’s 
OGL which encompasses a “non-endorsement” provision that prohibits the 
use of the released information “in a way that suggests any official status or 
that the Information Provider and/or Licensor endorse . . . [the licensor’s] 
use of the Information.”  Similar provisions can also be found in the Dutch 
OGD policy234 and in all CC licenses.235  A nonendorsement provision 
addresses a typical concern that the public sector has with open data.  
When releasing data to the public, government agencies normally aim to 
release it in a non-discriminative and neutral way.  After all, encouraging 
innovative uses of the data by the private sector does not mean endorsing or 






229. TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 118. 
230. See, e.g., GURIN, supra note 4, at 233; TAUBERER, supra note 1, at 149. 
231. See, e.g., Commission Notice, Guidelines on Recommended Standard Licences, supra note 
93, § 2.3.5; FDA, Terms of Services, supra note 88; Nat’l Archives, OGL Version 3, supra note 136; 
Open Data Commons, ODC-By v1.0, supra note 116, § 7.0; Open Data Commons, PDDL, supra note 
121, § 5.0. 
232. See, e.g., LEE ET AL., supra note 4, at 69. 
233. See, e.g., Stephen McJohn, The GPL Meets the UCC: Does Free Software Come with a 
Warranty of No Infringement?, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 19 (2014). 
234. See, e.g., Janssen, supra note 1, at 451. 
235. Creative Commons, supra note 96. 
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Rationale for Attribution in Open Data 
 
The right to be identified, or right of attribution or paternity, is the 
most important category of moral rights.236  Therefore, a government’s 
attitude toward appropriate attribution may be understood from the 
perspective of moral rights theory.  It should be noted that the 
government’s generation of data differs from that of individuals or 
enterprises making creative works.  Most government data is produced as a 
by-product of its daily functions.237  Therefore, although correct attribution 
can provide non-pecuniary rewards or incentives to authors of creative 
works,238 the same cannot be justified in the context of government data.  In 
addition, attribution rights have traditionally represented an artist’s 
personal connection to his or her creative works.239  This personal link 
hardly exists in the generation of government data.  
Nonetheless, governments occasionally gain political advantages from 
the attribution requirement because it helps craft the public impression that 
they have released some valuable data to society.  In this sense, 
governments, just like authors of creative works, benefit from situations 
where the relationship between the makers and their works is visible.240  
Greg Lastowka correctly indicated that attribution helps creators gain 
advantages in the reputation market.241  The same reasoning can be applied 
to governments’ open data licenses in which the attribution requirement 
may help them earn a positive public reputation. 
Another argument in favor of attribution is the “public interest theory” 
that states that the public can benefit from the disclosure of attribution.242  
 
236. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 168, at 361; Rajan, supra note 222, at 
926.  
237. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
238. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 1(4) ENT. L. REV. 121, 
122 (1990); Fisk, supra note 222, at 56–60; see also Asay, supra note 91, at 792 (noting that attribution 
is a significant drive for contributions in free or open source software or open content communities).   
239. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bock, Note: Using Public Disclosure as the Vesting Point for Moral 
Rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 153, 161–62 (2011); see also Robert C. 
Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 426 (2009) (Le droit moral [or 
moral right in France] . . . addresses legal rights that acknowledge a personal legal connection between 
an author and her creations); Dietz, supra note 168, at 207 (noting that morals rights in Germany 
Copyright Act focuses on the authors’ personal relationship with his or her creative works). 
240. See VON LEWINSKI, supra note 168, at 51. 
241. Lastowka, supra note 222, at 60–61; see also Bock, supra note 239, at 168 (“integrity and 
attribution are concerned with the reputation of the artist”). 
242. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 238, at 122; see also Fisk, supra note 222, at 54 
(“[a]ttribution is a type of signal, and it operates in labor and other markets plagued by information 
asymmetries in which reliable signals are important”); Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 167, at 107 
(noting that public interests are enhanced by attribution right, which prevents the public from being 
misled about the work); Margaret Ann Wilkinson, The Public Interest in Moral Rights Protection, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 193, 212–16 (2006) (analyzing moral rights’ public-interests function in information 
provision). 
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This theory is more suited to OGD policy. As the primary goal of OGD is 
to promote transparency, accountability, and economic development, the 
public has a stake in knowing whether the data is provided by the 
government and which government agency provided which data, dataset, or 
database.  The disclosure of this information can better enable citizens to 
assess the performance of government agencies and whether, and to what 
extent, the data release can help economic development. 
The “public interest theory” may also justify the nonendorsement 
provision mentioned above.  In many jurisdictions, moral rights are 
associated with not only a user’s obligation to identify the author but also a 
nonauthor’s right to object to false attribution.243  Creators can prevent 
works that they never created from being misattributed to them.244  This 
right is the reverse of attribution rights.245  The right to object to false 
attribution is different from a nonendorsement scenario because the former 
did not create the subject information at all, whereas governments did 
create the data in the latter but they refuse to endorse private parties’ uses 
of it.  Nevertheless, users in both scenarios attempt to ride on the coattails 
of another’s reputation and mislead the public in order to market their 
products or services.  In this sense, the “public interest theory” can also 
explain the rationale for the non-endorsement provision in government 
licenses.  Like the laws that prohibit false attribution, the nonendorsement 
provision helps prevent public deception.246  It is in the public interest to 
prevent governments or any other parties from receiving undue attribution 
or false association.247 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Governments collect and generate a great deal of data as a part of their 
daily functions, and this data has tremendous public and private value.  By 
enabling governments to release vast amounts of data in a timely manner, 
digital technologies propel the OGD movement.  Open data may contribute 
to the achievement of a wide range of social, economic, and political goals.  
Nevertheless, it also involves a variety of legal issues. The choice, or 
 
243. See, e.g., CORNISH ET AL., supra note 179, at 514; Bird, supra note 239, at 411–12; 
Dworkin, supra note 167, at 232; Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 167, at 130; Lee, supra note 168, at 
802; Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 361, 401 (2006). 
244. See, e.g., TANYA APLIN & JENNIFER DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS 151 (2nd ed. 2009); CORNISH ET AL., supra note 179, at 514; Robert C. Bird, Lucille 
M. Ponte Protecting Moral Rights In the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and 
Opportunities under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 221, 236–38 
(2006). 
245. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 238, at 122. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
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design, of licenses for OGD is not only a legal issue, but also a policy 
issue.  OGD licenses can form an important element of a government’s 
information policy, reflecting considerations that differ from those of 
proprietary licenses or community-based commons licenses in the private 
sector.  Therefore, this study argues that a government’s decisions 
regarding open data licenses reveal the priorities of its policy goals, which 
may be associated with transparency, accountability, collaboration, or 
economic growth. 
In this Article, three suites of public licenses developed by CC, ODC, 
and the British government are compared and analyzed.  They are probably 
the most notable licenses for government data and commonly considered 
by the public sector for open data policies.  As a huge amount of 
government data does not meet the originality requirement and thus is not 
copyrightable, these licenses may not constitute effective copyright 
protections in many OGD scenarios.  However, they can still function well 
as licenses of database rights in EU jurisdictions where database rights are 
protected as sui generis rights. In most other jurisdictions, such as Asian 
countries and the US, where there is no sui generis database right, these 
licenses may not be legally effective for non-copyrightable data and 
databases.  In these cases, governments are advised to implement CC0, 
PDM, or PDDM after conducting due diligence confirming the public 
domain status of the subject data.  
Moreover, attribution is the most common, and occasionally the only, 
requirement in OGD licenses.  This requirement is typically accompanied 
by a nonendorsement provision.  The existence of this design in open data 
licenses cannot be explained by traditional copyright theories because the 
data can hardly present a government’s personality and governments do not 
need user attribution as an incentive to generate data.  Nonetheless, these 
provisions can be understood by applying the public interest theory of 
moral right.  As the primary goal of OGD is to promote transparency, 
accountability, and economic development, the public has a vested interest 
in knowing whether the data is provided by the government and which 
government agency has produced it.  Moreover, governments need user 
attribution to earn a positive public reputation.  The nonendorsement 
provision is also used to protect the public interest by preventing 
governments or any other parties from benefiting from undue attribution or 
false association.  
 
